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COLLECTIVE RIGHTS LICENSING FOR INTERNET
DOWNLOADS AND STREAMS: WOULD IT
PROPERLY COMPENSATE RIGHTS
HOLDERS?
STEVEN MASUR*
I. INTRODUCTION
The law and business of media distribution in the United
States ("U.S.") developed in a world in which media was distributed
using technologies tightly controlled by a value chain of rights'
holders and distributors.' Advances in digital distribution technol-
ogies and widespread use of the Internet have moved media distri-
bution technology directly into the hands of consumers and made
it inexpensive and nearly instantaneous for creative members of the
general public.2 This sea of change calls for an examination of how
U.S. copyright law applies to new business models in a new era.
Empirically, threatening infringers with the stick of civil and crimi-
nal sanctions has not significantly reduced the illegal downloading
or use of media from the Internet.3 Neither have digital rights
management systems, nor the wide variety of offerings that en-
courage consumers to access content legally. Perhaps the carrot
that will wean people off illegal downloads is something that "feels
free," with the cost worked into the costs of other goods and ser-
vices, like the performance right that allows customers of bars and
* Steven Masur is a Senior Partner at MasurLaw, a business and entertain-
ment law firm best known for its pioneering work with new technologies. More
information about MasurLaw can be found at www.masurlaw.com. Steve would
like to thank Cynthia Katz, Tyler Mazey, Chris Lieber, Ema Takeda, Michelle
Quinn and Jonathan Lutzky for their valuable contributions to this piece.
1. See generally Roles of Today's Media Value-Chain Players (The Digital Medial
Project, Working Paper No. 0074r02/Los Angeles, 2004), available at
open.dmpf.org/dmp0074.doc (delineating some key players and their functions in
media value chain).
2. See, e.g., A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music File Shar-
ing, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND (Apr. 2008), http://www.eff.org/wp/better-way-
forward-voluntary-collective-licensing-music-file-sharing [hereinafter A Better Way]
(discussing problem of peer-to-peer file sharing, benefits stemming from that tech-
nological revolution and possible solution to fact that artists and copyright holders
need to be compensated for their work).
3. See David Kravets, File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads, After 5 Years of RIAA
Litigation, WIRED (Sept. 2008, 2:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatievel/2008/
09/proving-file-sh/ (discussing failed attempts to reduce file sharing of pirated
music despite tactics of RIAA to make costs extremely high for getting caught with
file sharing account).
(39)
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restaurants to listen to music for free. One proposed solution that
has garnered a significant amount of attention in the U.S. is collec-
tive rights licensing at the Internet service provider ("ISP") level.4
In short, a fee for using and sharing media accessed on the Internet
could be applied at the point of access, the ISP.5 Could ISP licens-
ing be the solution to Internet "piracy"?
Since the early days of media distribution on the Internet, a
wide variety of individuals and industry groups have suggested col-
lective compensation schemes to compensate rights holders for
content accessed on the Internet.6 The Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation ("EFF") has been a proponent as early as 2003.7 Groups
such as Choruss are currently attempting to get the idea rolling by
working with U.S. universities and building a small music-royalty fee
into tuition payments in order to legalize music swapping through
file sharing.8 Around the world, other countries are experimenting
with "three strikes you're out" laws, and other compulsory rights
licensing systems, to stem the tide of illegal downloads within their
borders.9 For example, under HADOPI 2, France's controversial
new three strikes law, an internet user caught downloading illegal
content three times would lose the right to access internet services
4. See Sam Gustin, Music Outlaws, There's a New Sherff in Town, WIRED (Mar.
27, 2008), http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2008/03/portfo-
lio 0327 (delineating proposal in which users would pay monthly fee as part of
their internet service bill to have access to music database thereby giving people
access to music while simultaneously paying money due to artists and copyright
holders).
5. See id. ("Consumers will pay a monthly fee, bundled into an internet service
bill in exchange for unfettered access to a database of all known music.").
6. See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation Releases File Sharing Recommendations,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND (Feb. 24, 2004), http://w2.eff.org/share/
20040224_eff pr.php (portraying Electronic Frontier Foundation favours volun-
tary collective licensing as solution to "music file-sharing controversy").
7. See A Better Way, supra note 2 (delineating specifics of voluntary collective
licensing proposal whereby listeners would pay subscription fee to gain access to
music database and artists and copyright holders would therefore be fairly
compensated).
8. See Eliot Van Burskirk, Three Major Record Labels join the 'Choruss', WIRED
(Dec. 8, 2008, 8:55 AM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2008/12/warner-mu-
sic-gr/ (describing Choruss' file-sharing plan whereby universities would use some
tuition money to subscribe to Choruss' database which gives students ability to
continue downloading [music] as they have been. . .without fear of legal repri-
sal"); see also Fred von Lohmann, More on Choruss, Pro and Con, ELECTRONIC FRON.
TIER FOUND (Mar. 20, 2009), http://eff.org/deeplinks/2009/03/more-choruss-
pro-and-con (entailing overview of Choruss).
9. See MASURLAw, STEVE MASUR, COLLECTIVE LICENSING AT THE ISP LEVEL 124-
220 (IAEL International Entertainment Law Series) (2010) (discussing the "three
strikes laws" of various countries or areas including Korea, Singapore, European
Union, France, Sweden and United Kingdom).
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COLLECTIVE RIGHTs LICENSING
from home, subject only to French due process requirements.10
Furthermore, the idea of ISP Licensing is starting to gain traction
even in the recording industry, with Warner Music Group leading
the way as well as EMI Music and Universal Music Group open to
the concept, if properly executed."
While there have been many proposals for collective rights li-
censing schemes, most proposals fall into two camps: a new legisla-
tively introduced public right; or a privately implemented opt-in
arrangement.' 2 Under the former, the government-mandated pub-
lic right is collected as a payment on a user's ISP or mobile phone
bill and distributed through a third party organization to rights
holders.13 Under the latter, rights holders sign a covenant not to
sue any user who opts-in to pay licensing fees for content which is
accessed by that user. 14
Many people in the media business have given their opinion
about whether either of these proposals is a good idea.' 5 Very few,
howeverm have discussed how the proposal would actually work
under United States law. This article reviews the historical under-
pinnings of collective and mandatory collective rights licensing
schemes, and discusses the legal and practical problems associated
with implementing any collective licensing scheme at the ISP level
in the United States.
II. CURRENT US LAw AND PRACTICE
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, known as
the Intellectual Property Clause, provides the basis for U.S. copy-
right law in the U.S.16 This provision gives Congress the power to
10. See id. at 154-210 (discussing France's three strikes law, HADOPI 2).
11. See A Better Way, supra note 2 (discussing growing popularity of ISP
licensing).
12. See Steven Masur, Collective Rights Licensing at the ISP Level: A Worldwide Sur-
vey of the Law of Collective Rights Licensing, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EN-
TERTAINMENT LAwYERs, http://collectiverights.org/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2010)
(discussing two proposals for collective rights licensing schemes).
13. See id. ("The first approach is a government-mandated public right to col-
lect money at the ISP level to be distributed to rights holders to compensate for
free internet media consumption."). For a further discussion of this approach, see
infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
14. See id. ("The second approach is a voluntary system in which rights hold-
ers would sign a covenant not to sue for copyright infringement for file or stream
sharing any individual user who opts-in to pay licensing fees for content they access
on the internet."). For a further discussion of this approach, see infra notes 118-
149 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Lohmann, supra note 8 (providing opinion on Choruss).
16. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 [hereinafter Intellectual Property Clause] ("To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
2011] 41
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grant creators of original works exclusive rights in relation to their
works for a limited period of time.17 In 1788, in The Federalist Pa-
pers, James Madison wrote that the utility of Congress's copyright
authority will "scarcely be questioned."18 U.S. copyright law seeks
to incentivize artists, authors, musicians, artisans and other creators
by granting them this limited monopoly.19 The Copyright Act of
1976, Title 17 of the U.S. Code, is the current federal statute gov-
erning U.S. copyright law.2 0 The Act protects original works of au-
thorship fixed in tangible media of expression and affords
copyright owners a distinctive bundle of rights to control and finan-
cially benefit from the exploitation of their works. 2' In particular,
Section 106 of the Act imparts on all copyright proprietors the ex-
clusive right to reproduce and adapt their works; "in the case of
literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform and
display their works;" and "in the case of sound recordings, to per-
form their works publicly by means of a digital audio transmis-
sion."22 When Internet users stream, download, upload and
otherwise share copyrighted content over the Internet without per-
mission from the rights holders, these users are reproducing, dis-
playing and/or publicly performing others' works. Under Section
501 of the Act, this constitutes copyright infringement.23
Even though this qualifies as copyright infringement, millions
of users have seized the opportunities that digital technology pro-
vides to obtain and share creative works without permission. 24
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries")
(emphasis added).
17. See id. (granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors over their
works).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
19. See Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, Ass'N OF
RESEARCH LIBRARIES, http://www.arl.org/pp/ppcopyright/copyresources/copy-
timeline.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (providing timeline of U.S. copyright
protection, including goal of each copyright act).
20. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1332 (West 1976) (detailing current law
regarding copyright protection).
21. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 1976) ("Copyright protection subsists, in ac-
cordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device.").
22. 17 U.S.C.A. §106(5)-(6) (West 2002).
23. 17 U.S.C.A. §501 (West 2002) (delineating violations which shall consti-
tute copyright infringement).
24. See David Kravets, RIAA Thomas Appeal Denied; Retrial Likely to Set New Copy-
right Infringement Course, WIRED (Dec. 28, 2008, 10:36 PM) http://www.wired.com/
[Vol. 18: p. 39
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Sharing copyrighted material that has not been paid for on the in-
ternet has become a mainstream pursuit.25 The vast majority,
ninety percent (90%) or more, of peer-to-peer (P2P) file transfers
are in violation of copyright laws and threaten the viability of U.S.
businesses with business models that depend upon copyright pro-
tection.26 The collateral damage from digital piracy includes: the
suppression of overall economic growth, the thwarting of innova-
tion, an onslaught of litigation and a dramatic reduction in sales for
record and motion picture companies that many believe is the di-
rect result of file sharing.27 For example, the movie, Batman: The
Dark Knight, was reportedly illegally downloaded more than seven
million times within a couple months of its release, despite Warner
Brothers' aggressive anti-piracy campaign.28 While debatable
whether the downloads are the result of file sharing alone, there is
no doubt that recent losses in the entertainment industry have
caused significant harm to the overall U.S. economy.2 9 U.S. indus-
tries that rely heavily on copyright protection to generate revenue
are among "the most important growth drivers of the U.S. econ-
omy, contributing nearly 40% of the growth achieved by all U.S.
private industry and nearly 60% of the growth of [the total US] U.S.
exportable products."30 Thus, "it has been reported that roughly
40% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") is affected by the in-
threatle-vel/20-08/12/judge-denies-ri/ (noting thirty million people sued for shar-
ing copyrighted media online).
25. See Piracy: Online and on the Street, RECORDING INDUS. Ass'N OF AMERICA,
http://ww-w.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2010) (delineating
consequences of music theft or piracy).
26. See Richard Cotton & Margaret L. Tobey, Reply Comments of NBC Universal,
Inc. In the Matter of re Broadband Industry. Practices, at 1 (WC Docket No. 07-52 (FCC
Feb. 28, 2008)), available at www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.aspx?id=713 [herein-
after Broadband Industry Matter] ("The record compiled in this proceeding con-
firms that fewer than five percent of Internet users consume at least 60 to 70
percent of broadband network capacity through peer-to-peer file-sharing and that
some 90 percent of this traffic consists of illegal, pirated content.").
27. See id. (describing some consequences of illegal peer-to-peer file sharing).
28. See Brian Stelter & Brad Stone, Digital Pirates Winning Battle with Major
Hollywood Studios, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at Al (stating Warner Brothers' anti-
piracy campaign failed as evidenced by fact that illegal copies of movie had been
downloaded more than seven million times by year end).
29. See Broadband Industry Matter, supra note 26 (noting effect on US economy
is staggering).
30. Stephen E. Siwek, The True Cost of Motion Picture Piracy to the U.S. Economy,
INST. FOR POLICY INNOVATION, 4 (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.ipi.org (follow "Pub-
lications" hyperlink; then follow "by Date" hyperlink; then follow "2006" hyperlink;
then follow "The True Cost of Motion Picture Piracy to the U.S. Economy" hyper-
link; then follow "Full Text PDF" hyperlink).
2011] 43
5
Masur: Collective Rights Licensing for Internet Downloads and Streams: W
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011
44 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
adequate protection of intellectual property, and U.S. losses due to
piracy are staggering."31
Documenting the mass and volume of infringement taking
place on the Internet and seeking legal recourse against culpable
individuals has proven overwhelmingly costly and time consum-
ing.3 2 For example, the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) has sued more than 30,000 individuals in the past five
years.33 Most of these cases have resulted in settlements, and this
strategy has done nothing to stem the tide of uncompensated use of
copyrighted works on the Internet.3 4 Further, efforts towards pur-
suing infringers have led to a backlash and consumer criticism,
while still not making a significant dent in the amount of piracy.35
In the digital era, the ubiquity and worldwide scope of electronic
distribution networks, the ease and speed of technologically assisted
reproduction, and the overall financial stakes involved have in-
creased both the complexity of and the necessity for effective man-
agement of copyrights in sound recordings and other forms of
intellectual property.
III. GOVERNMENT-MANDATED PUBLIC RIGHT
A. Overview
As a possible solution to the problems associated with digital
piracy, government-mandated collective rights licensing is being es-
poused by a wide range of proponents.3 6 It is difficult to lump the
31. Press Release, Record Industry Association of America, RIAA Comments on U.S.
Trade Rep's Special 301 Report Highlighting Piracy Issues in Key International Markets,
INDus. Ass'N oF AMEliCA (Apr. 5, 2008), http://www.riaa.com/news-room.php?
news_m-onthfilter=4&ne-ws-year-filter=2008 [hereinafter RIAA Comments] (fol-
low "RIAA Comments on U.S. Trade Rep's Special 301 Report Highlighting Piracy
Issues in Key International Markets" hyperlink).
32. See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, $17M for Legal Fees Is Money Well Spent, RJAA
Says, ABA JouRNAL (July 29, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
17mjfor_1e-gal feesismoney-we-llspent riaaIsays/ (stating Recording Industry
Association of America spent more than $17 million in legal fees in 2008 for suits
against copyright infringers),
33. See Kravets, supra note 24 (stating Recording Industry Association of
America has sued more than 30,000 people for making copyrighted material avail-
able online).
34. See Gustin, supra note 4 ("In the last year, the Recording Association of
America, the industry group that represents the major labels, has sent 5,400 threat-
ening letters to students at more than 150 schools, and reached settlements with
more than 2,300 them.").
35. See, e.g., Piracy: Online and on the Street, supra note 25 (providing statistics
regarding huge economic effect of copyright infringement despite RIAA's aggres-
sive litigation against such infringers).
36. See Masur, supra note 12 ("Although there have been many proposals for
how to implement a collective licensing system, most people gravitate to two basic
[Vol. 18: p. 39
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various proposals into one set of arguments, but generally speaking,
the proponents of a government-mandated right contend that the
market cannot solve this problem on its own, and the government
needs to step in. 7 They argue further that Congress should amend
the copyright laws to create a right to collect reasonable fees from
all Internet users at their point of access, in exchange for the ability
to consume music and other copyrighted intellectual property on
the Internet.38 The most publicized model would require all U.S.
ISPs and university networks to add a fee (figures around five U.S.
dollars are being proposed) to their usual charges and funnel the
money collected to one or more existing or newly-formed Collec-
tive Rights Organizations (CROs).39 In order to collect their por-
tion of the fee, artists and other rights holders would be required to
join a CRO, and each CRO would be responsible for distributing
the proceeds received from the ISPs among its members based
upon a formula reflecting the value of the works or the number of
times the works are exploited by Internet users. 40 The ISP's role in
collecting fees would be to warrant retention of a small percentage
of the fees collected to be used for investment in network capacity
and to pay for up-to-date content identification and monitoring
technologies.4' According to some, the fees collected would "cre-
approaches. The first approach is a government-mandated public right to collect
money at the ISP level to be distributed to rights holders to compensate for free
internet media consumption.").
37. See RIAA Comments, supra note 31 (stating that both U.S. and foreign gov-
ernments need to become involved in regulating copyright infringement and
piracy).
38. See Gustin, supra note 4 (describing Warner Music Group's proposal in
which users would pay monthly fee as part of their internet service bill to have
access to music database).
39. See id. ("Warner's plan would have consumers pay an additional fee -
maybe $5 a month - bundled into their monthly Internet access bill in exchange
for the right to freely download, upload, copy, and share music without
restrictions.").
40. See Frank Rose, Music Industy Proposes a Piracy Surcharge on ISPs (Mar. 13,
2008), http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2008/03/music_1evy
(stating monthly fees would create pool from which artists and copyright holders
whose music is part of database would be paid); see also Masur, supra note 12.
The basic idea is that a fee for use and sharing of media accessed on the
internet should be applied at the point of access, the mobile or internet
service provider, or ISP. The money collected would be distributed to the
rights holders who own and have the right to license the media accessed
on the internet.
Id.
41. See M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 780 (D.N.J.
1923), noted in Robert P. Merges, The Continuing Vitality of Music Performance Rights
Organizations 17-18 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1266870, 2008),
http://papers.ssr-n.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1266870 (follow "One-Click
2011] 45
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ate a pool as large as $20 billion annually to pay artists and copy-
right holders."42
B. Previously Established Collective Rights Licensing Regimes
In evaluating how a new mandatory collective right might
work, it is useful to look at where previous mandatory rights licens-
ing has been applied, and why.4 3 According to Warner Music
Group executive, Jim Griffin, " [c]ollective licensing is what people
do when they lose control, or when control is no longer practical or
efficient."44 Music composition copyright holders and songwriters
faced a similar loss of control over exploitation of their works in the
early 1900s, which prompted Congress to institute a mandatory col-
lective rights licensing regime to protect their works. 4 5 Implemen-
tation of a government-mandated public right related to use of
music on the internet is similar to collective licensing of musical
compositions and the administrative functions of the performance
rights organizations (PROs) that currently collect and distribute
performance royalties. In 1897 an exclusive right of public per-
formance was established for songwriters through the U.S. Copy-
right Act.46 Despite this revision, songwriters and composers did
not have the resources or an efficient method to enforce and pro-
tect their right of public performance.47 Although licensing agree-
ments were obtainable, it was impractical and almost impossible for
the owners of bars, restaurants, hotels and other enterprises to seek
out the rights holders of every musical composition played on any
Download" hyperlink) (using small percentage of fees use for investment
payments).
42. Gustin, supra note 4.
43. See id. (discussing collective licensing)
44. Id.
45. See MEG HARGREAVES, THE DIGITAL MILLENIUM COPYRIGHT Acr 17-19
(Supp. 2005) (demonstrating loss of control copyright holders suffered in early
1990s). For example, in the early 1990s, innovative technological advances ena-
bled copying, sharing and storing digital music files to become inexpensive and
accessible. See id. at 17 (explaining how copyright holders began losing control as
coping, sharing and storing music files became easier). With the advent of peer-to-
peer sharing networks, as well as, increased computer processing power and stor-
age capacity, song-writers and copyright holders were unable to effectively police
unauthorized use of their intellectual property. See id. at 17-18 (noting technologi-
cal advances that enabled greater unauthorized use of music).
46. See Neil Conley, The Future of Licensing Music Online: The Role of Collective
Rights Organizations and the Effect of Territoriality, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 408, 415 (2008) (establishing public performance right for songwriters
through 17 U.S.C. §106).
47. See Conley, supra note 46 at 414 (discussing limited resources or lack of
efficient methods to enforce and protect their rights of public performance).
[Vol. 18: p. 39
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given night or day.48 PROs were needed for efficiency and practi-
cality.4 9 The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publish-
ers (ASCAP) was the first PRO in the U.S.50 Through the ASCAP,
blanket licenses were granted to establishments and services operat-
ing for profit and playing music under authorization of the AS-
CAP's member songwriters and publishers. 51
In 1923, a landmark decision for performance rights was
handed down by the District Court of New Jersey; the court held
"that songs played during radio broadcasts were played for profit
and required a license from the rights holder of the song."5 2 Ac-
cording to Neil Conley, "[i]n 1926, the advent of coast-to-coast ra-
dio networks created an incredible source of revenue for
songwriters" and music publishers.53 "However, negotiations be-
tween radio broadcasters and ASCAP regarding licensing rates be-
came more and more difficult as the years passed."5 4 In 1940, to
combat these difficulties in negotiations with ASCAP, a number of
broadcasters of major radio networks and about 500 independent
radio stations created a second PRO, Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI).56
Paul Heineke, a European music publisher, established in 1931 the
third PRO in the US, Society of European Stage Authors and Com-
posers (SESAC).56 Currently, ASCAP and BMI represent most
48. See id. (pointing out difficulty and impracticability of obtaining licensing
agreements at every public venue).
49. See id. at 414-15 (mentioning PROs).
50. See id. at 416 (discussing American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP) as first PRO in United States).
51. See id. (discussing ASCAP).
52. Id. (citing M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 780
(D.N.J. 1923)). M. Witmark & Sons was landmark case for performance rights since
radios were now required to get licenses from rights holders in order to play songs
during broadcasts. See M. Witmark & Sons, 291 F. 776 at 780 (noting influence of
radios in performance rights).
53. Conley, supra note 46 at 416.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 416-17 (detailing reasons for formation of Broadcast Music, Inc.);
see also Tradition, BROADCAST Music, INC., http://www.bmi.com/about/entry/
533105 (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) ("BMI was founded by radio executives to pro-
vide competition in the field of performing rights, to assure royalty payments to
writers and publishers of music not represented by the existing performing right
organization and to provide an alternative source of licensing for all music
users.").
56. See Conley, supra note 46 at 417 (discussing SESAC); see also About SESAC,
SESAC.com, http://www.sesac.com/About/History.aspx (last visited Oct. 25,
2010) [hereinafter About SESAC] (explaining origin and history of SESAC).
472011]
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songwriters and music publishers while SESAC licenses around one
percent (1%) of all performance rights in the U.S. 5 7
Conley explains that "[m]usic publishers, through an agree-
ment, grant to the [PRO] the right to license all of the songs con-
trolled by the music publisher."5 8 "A [PRO]'s repertoire is the
[PRO]'s entire collection of songs from the thousands of songwrit-
ers and music publishers that have entered into agreements with
the [PRO]."59 As a result, in the U.S., any user of publicly per-
formed music- be it a theatre, hotel, restaurant, club, bar or a
radio station- must pay to the PROs an annual fee for a blanket
license for the unlimited public performance of any or all of the
songs in each PRO's repertoire.6 0 After calculating how frequently
each song is played, the PROs collect royalties from these licenses
accordingly and pay out to publishers and songwriters their
shares. 61 The PRO pays the publisher's share (50%) directly to the
publisher and the songwriter's share (50%) directly to the song-
writer.6 2The most recently created compulsory right is the perform-
ance right in sound recordings in some kinds of digital media
created by the Digital Performance in Sound Recordings Act of
199563 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.64 This
right requires hosts of radio style online music programming to pay
a royalty set by the Copyright Royalty Board to artists and copyright
owners.65 The U.S. Copyright Office designated SoundExchange as
the sole entity entitled to administer these royalties.66 Any artists
57. See Conley, supra note 46 at 422 (stating breakdown of licenses between
ASCAP, BMI and SESAC); see also About SESAC, supra note 56 (discussing SESAC's
role in licensing); ASCAP Licensing: Frequently Asked Questions, ASCP, http://www.
ascap.com/licensing/licensingfaq.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010) [hereinafter AS-
CAP FAQs] (describing ASCAP as "worldwide leader in performance royalties, ser-
vice, and advocacy for songwriters, composers, and music publishers"); About BMI,
BMI.com, http://www.bmi.com/about/?link=navbar (last visited Oct. 25, 2010)
[hereinafter About BMIJ (providing that BMI represents more than 475,000 song-
writers, composers and publishers with more than 6.5 million works).
58. Conley, supra note 46 at 422.
59. Id.
60. See id. (noting methodology of PROs).
61. See id. at 422-23 (discussing function of PROs).
62. See id. at 423 (describing payout by PROs).
63. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 336
(1995).
64. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1999).
65. See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, P118 Stat 2341
(2005) (requiring royalty payment by radio style online music programming to
artists and copyright owners).
66. See Copyright Office regulation 270.5(c), 37 C.F.R. § 270.5(c) (dictating
designation of SoundExchange).
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whose work is played on a recording can collect royalties from on-
line performance by registering with SoundExchange. 67
Proponents of a new digital right argue that just as radio net-
works created an incredible source of revenue for songwriters and
PROs allowed songwriters and music publishers to reap the finan-
cial rewards of widespread exploitation of their works, government-
mandated collective rights licensing of media files distributed using
the Internet represents a way for copyright holders to reap the fi-
nancial rewards of this new means of widespread exploitation.68
Even with its limited application, SoundExchange has already dis-
tributed $417 million since 2003.69 Proponents also argue for a
compulsory license fee to avoid the difficulty of sorting out and re-
negotiating contractual claims since most files are shared on the
Internet for free.70 They propose that society at large would benefit
from lower transaction costs and less litigation, because the sharing
of content on the Internet would be legitimized and compen-
sated.71 Thus, advocating that a marketplace of competing file
sharing, streaming applications and ancillary services could develop
in a legal, rather than an illegal, setting.72
C. Consumer Behaviour in an Age of Free Access
Many supporters of collective licensing argue that free access
to unlimited media on the Internet is a public good. Simultane-
ously and conversely, an increasing number of countries are intro-
ducing "three strikes you're out" legislation, in which a user who is
repeatedly found downloading copyrighted material will lose access
to the Internet at home.73 Questions remain as to whether these
67. Get Paid When You Get Played, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://soundexchange.
com/performer-owner/performer-srco-home/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (provid-
ing service paying royalties).
68. See Record Industry Association of America, Press Release, RIAA Com-
ments on U.S. Trade Rep's Special 301 Report Highlighting Piracy Issues in Key
International Markets (Apr. 5, 2008), http://www.riaa.com/news-room.php?news
monthfilter=4&news-year filter=2008 (follow "RLAA Comments on U.S. Trade
Rep's Special 301 Report Highlighting Piracy Issues in Key International Markets"
hyperlink) (discussing argument of proponent of new digital rights).
69. See The Numbers, SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://soundexchange.com/about/
the-numbers/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (listing distribution my SoundExchange).
70. See Collective Management of Copyright and Related Right, WIPO, http://
www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/about-collective-mngt.html#P118_15843 [hereinafter
Collective Management] (discussing licensing fees to be charged).
71. See id. (discussing benefit of lower transactional costs).
72. See id. (describing idea of marketplace of competing file sharing).
73. See Matthew Ingram, RIAA Drops Lawsuit Strategy for "Three Strikes" Plan,
GIGAoM.coM (Dec. 19, 2008, 9:35 AM, PDT) http://gigaom.com/2008/12/19/
riaa-drops-lawsuit-strategy-for-three-strikes-plan/ (giving France as example of
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measures will really serve to keep prosecuted file sharers off the
Internet, or whether this is, in fact, good. 7 4 France, which enacted
its three strikes law in September of 2009, has yet to issue a warning
as of this article. Even though P2P infringement is down in France,
the amount of total infringement has actually increased.7 5 Because
there is a possibility that the U.S. could adopt similar legislation,
one should understand how free access to a nearly unlimited reper-
toire of music, film, pictures and text has affected U.S. society.
The numbers show that the desire of consumers to experience
music, motion pictures and other forms of multimedia products
and the yearning to express themselves through music and video
continues to increase.76 For example, in 2006, websites featuring
user-generated media content attracted sixty-nine million users in
the U.S. alone, and they are projected to attract 101 million U.S.
users by 2011.77 According to research firm, Parks Associates, the
number of U.S. households with broadband access watching full-
length movies and TV shows online doubled in the past year.7 8
Even in just the month of June, more than 10.2 billion videos were
streamed in the U.S. 79 According to BigChampagne, an online me-
dia measurement company, the average simultaneous P2P popula-
tion grew from over five million users in December of 2002 to over
seven million by December of 2004, and this increase in P2P popu-
country which is trying to enforce system where after three illegal downloading
attempts, internet service will be cut off by internet service provider).
74. See id. (questioning how accurate process would be and effect process
would have on public).
75. See Nate Anderson, Piracy up in France after tough three-stikes law passed, ARS
TECHNICA (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/
2010/03/piracy-up-in-france-after-tough-three-strikes-law-passed.ars (discussing
P2P infringement numbers versus total infringement numbers).
76. See JAB Platform Status Report: User Generated Content, Social Media, and Adver-
tising-An Overview 1, INTERACTIVE ADVERTISING BuEAU (April 2008), available at
http://www.iab.net/iab-products-and-industry-services/508676/1488/ugc-
platform (follow "Download User-Generated Content and Social Media Advertis-
ing Overview" hyperlink) [hereinafter IAB Platform Status Report] (explaining user
generated content growing rapidly because of better technology and faster
internet).
77. See id. (defining force of User Generated Content growth and projections
for future growth).
78. See Greg Sandoval, Hulu's backers bicker as Web video soars, TECHNOLOGY
NEWS - CNET NEWS (Nov. 16, 2009, 10:45 AM, PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
31001_.3-10398698-261.html?tag=mncol;ln ("The number of US households with
broadband access that watched full-length movies and TV shows online doubled in
the past year, according to research firm, Parks Associates.").
79. See June 2010: More than 10B Videos Streamed in U.S., NIELSENWIRE (July 16,
2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online-mobile/june-2010-more-
than-1Ob-videos-streamed-in-u-s/ (discussing amount of videos streamed in United
States in June 2010).
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lations is continuing year after year.80 The proliferation of music,
video and photographic editing software coupled with the distribu-
tion power offered by P2P networks has fuelled a new generation of
creative expression. Rather than being limited to a handful of au-
thorized services like Apple's iTunes or Rhapsody, access to unlim-
ited media from any source has increased the number of cultural
reference points from which artists draw to create new works. As a
result, the argument that free access to media on the Internet has
contributed to a better-educated public, and that both the volume
and quality of artistic output have increased as a result is well-
founded.81 Sections of the population who could not previously af-
ford access to certain artistic works, cultural reference points or re-
search materials can now enjoy free access through a $300 net
book computer and an Internet connection. 82 Thus, this may serve
to decrease the "digital divide."8 3 As Professor Seymour Papert of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology stated:
Getting information online saves the cost of printing text-
books, and this is a case where what is cheaper is also bet-
ter . . . The computer can serve as a library, a laboratory
and an art studio, saving the cost of these or making those
that exist far more effective. 84
Furthermore, we have already seen with services like Flickr,
Twitter and YouTube, that dissemination of news, picture and video
collection to millions of consumers has increased the number of
data points from which our news is collected, theoretically improv-
ing how much we learn about happenings in the world. Similarly,
millions of consumers with unlimited access to the world's media
80. See Adam Toll, BigChampagne LLC, Peer-to-Peer Filesharing Technology:
Consumer Protection and Competition Issues 3, Presentation at the FTC Work-
shop: Peer-to-Peer File Sharing (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/work-
shops/filesharing/presentations/toll.pdf (showing graphical data of P2P
population growth).
81. See AB Platform Status Report, supra note 76 at 4-8 (showing expression
through personal blogs, social media and acquiring news from blog sites of New
York Times and Newsweek are significant advantages to social media advances).
82. See Clint Witchalls, Bridging the Digital Divide, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 17,
2005) available at www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2005/feb/17/olpc.onlinesup-
plement (explaining MIT students' plan to build laptops as cheaply as one hun-
dred dollars, thus making Internet resources available to even more people).
83. See id. (describing plan to reach poor with laptops around world will break
down barrier between benefits of rich and allow poor to access Internet and
computers).
84. Id. (quoting Seymour Papert, Professor, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology).
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collection will both preserve and foster its growth. 5 Fans sharing
media may be the best distributors, decision makers and preservers
of media, which were previously costly roles for media companies to
fulfil. For example, MediaBranz, a user-maintained community
music metadatabase, has already compiled information covering
9,605,951 tracks and 813,659 album releases.86 If these activities
were made legal, this could aid in the claiming of "orphan works"
and automated submission process services might evolve for copy-
right owners to register their works with the appropriate databases,
for collection and payment of rights licences.87 For all of these rea-
sons, we should not dismiss the possibility that free access to media
on the Internet could be in fact, good, and that what is missing are
evolved business models establishing payment mechanisms.
D. Issues with Implementation
Implementation of a mandatory collective rights licensing sys-
tem, would require a revisions to the copyright provisions in Sec-
tion 17 of the U.S. Code.88 For this to occur, a bill setting forth the
revisions would need to be introduced and lobbied through Con-
gress.89 If our experience with the DMCA is any guide, this would
involve months of negotiations in congressional committees, and
might take years before the resulting language is brought to a
vote.90
Specific revisions that would be required include a licensing
scheme that authorizes ISP customers to copy, display and publicly
perform works downloaded from and uploaded to computers on
the Internet. Such rights were previously reserved exclusively for
owners of the copyrighted material in question, suggesting that they
will want a say in deciding how the licensing scheme would work.
85. See lAB Platform Status Report, supra note 76 at 1: (detailing how user gener-
ated content is shaping content sharing and distribution by public instead of
through companies).
86. See Database Statistics, MusicBRAINZ, http://musicbrainz.org/show/stats/
(last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (establishing data for consumer downloads in various
categories such as artist, track and album).
87. SeeJoseph Merante, Role in the Remedy: Finding a Place for ISPs in the Digital
Music World, 29 Lov. L.A. Ewr. L. REv. 387, 388 (2009) (describing benefits to
"orphan works").
88. See Brian R. Day, Collective Management of Music Copyright in the Digital Age:
The Online Clearinghouse, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 195, 213-15 (2010) (advocating
specifically for revisions of either sectionl06 or section115).
89. See id. at 199-209 (providing how Congress has dealt with copyright issues
previous to this problem).
90. See id. at 203-08 (reviewing legislative history of DMCA in act's enactment
and amendment).
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The legislation also would need to describe in some detail the entity
responsible for accounting to the rights holders, and possibly pro-
vide guidelines for measuring how much to pay particular rights
holders.9 1 While SoundExchange was not created by statute, the
organization only covers a very limited right. Furthermore, there is
a presumption that rights holders would retain their rights to sue
Internet users for direct infringement if they fail to pay the fees or
otherwise circumvent the system. Similarly, ISPs would probably re-
main secondarily liable for copyright infringement if they failed to
properly account to the CROs for all of the fees collected from
their customers.
Proponents of government-mandated collective rights licens-
ing have yet to address whether or not rights holders would retain
the exclusive right to create and authorize derivatives of their works
or otherwise retain control over how users manipulate their
works.92 Furthermore, ongoing heated debate continues as to what
constitutes fair use.93 Fair use, codified in 17 U.S.C. section 107,
permits the reproduction of copyrighted works for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or re-
search without the authorization of the copyright holder.94 Copy-
right holders must recognize and assess the merits of such an
affirmative defense before bringing a claim of copyright infringe-
ment.95 Given the various interpretations found by courts in recent
cases on the topic, this has become a complex judgment to make.96
As Cardozo law professor, Justin Hughes, states, "[t] he notion of
91. See Licensing - General FAQ HFA, http://harryfox.com/public/Licensing-
GeneralFAQ~jsp (last visited Oct. 26, 2010) (offering information about one of
world's leading mechanical licensing organizations, Harry Fox Company). In the
past, for example with the performance right collection societies, and in regard to
collection of mechanical rights by Harry Fox, an actual existing organization was
not designated. See id. (noting lack of existing organization for collection of
mechanical rights). Rather, the attributes required for such an organization, or
the requirements for proper payment of compulsory licensing fees or collection of
blanket licensing fees were described in the statute in question. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106.
92. See Sarah McBride and Adam Thompson, Google, Others Contest Copyright
Warnings, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2007. [hereinafter Google, Other Contest Copyright
Warnings] (discussing Computer and Commission Industry Association's claim
challenging legality of Major League Baseball's exclusive right to dissemination of
their broadcasts).
93. See id. (introducing fair use debates involving Google's proposed plan to
digitize books and make them available on demand).
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992) (defining fair use).
95. See Google, Other Contest Copyright Warnings, supra note 92 (describing
CCIA's claim against MLB).
96. See id. (detailing these judgments).
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fair use is expanding in the digital age." 9 7 Perhaps the legislative
implementation process would provide an opportunity to clarify
more precisely what constitutes fair use, since at least some of the
material being downloaded could arguably fall into this defini-
tion.98 No matter how this is finally decided, users who claim their
exploitation of copyrighted works on the Internet constitutes fair
use will likely rebel against mandatory fees for the usage of copy-
righted works. Finally, given the consent decree under which both
ASCAP and BMI currently operate, Congress would need to remain
alert to anti-trust concerns presented by one or more new or ex-
isting CROs assigned the task of collecting fees.99
Opponents of compulsory collective licensing claim that this
amounts to a tax for consumption of intellectual property on the
Internet where the cost is allocated to all users equally, regardless of
their individual consumption level.100 They point to the inequity in
forcing some users to subsidize the activities of others.' 0 ' Further-
more, consumers with strong moral and ethical positions would be
financially supporting content to which they are morally or ethically
opposed. Finally, data collection and use practices would need to
conform to the requirements of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA), so that users' private information, including
personal media consumption data, would not be sold without users'
consent to marketing firms and other unauthorized parties. 102
A variety of problems need to be solved with respect to data
collection, use and measurement. There is an entire market of In-
ternet media tracking, security, usage measurement, cyber investi-
gation and royalty collection firms. 03 For example, by matching
partial IP addresses to zip codes, a technology-driven, media mea-
97. See id. (quoting Professor Hughes).
98. See id. (noting potential effects on fair use).
99. See Day, supra note 88 at 213-15 (stating that both ASCAP and BMI are
under court ordered consent decrees).
100. See Neil Desai, Copyright and Culture (Voluntary Collective Licensing-Innova-
tion or Extortion?) Annotated Bibliography, UNIVERSrIY OF PENNSYLVANIA LIBRARY (Apr.
15, 2009) http://tags.library.upenn.edu/project/4085 7 [hereinafter Copyright and
Culture] (opining that enacting this kind of legislation would be strategic move
requiring each household to pay approximately twenty seven dollars per year but
could possibly create problems of usage amounts).
101. See id. (describing unfair results occurring when users must subsidize ac-
tivities of others).
102. See Electronic Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 (2008) (setting
out laws of Electronic Communications Privacy Act).
103. SeeJeff Howe, BigChampagne is Watching You, WIRED (Oct. 2003), available
at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/ 11.1 0/fileshare.html (discussing individ-
uals involved in California based company, BigChampagne, engaged in internet
media tracking).
[Vol. 18: p. 39
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss1/2
COLLECTIVE RIGHTs LICENSING
surement company, known as BigChampagne, uses its software to
create a real-time map of music downloading.10 4 But who is to say
which has the most reliable system and best data? Without empiri-
cal proof of whose technology is best for measuring media con-
sumption, many argue that ISPs and CROs would merely be
providing "good guesses" on how the collected fees should be dis-
tributed. 05 Without doubt additional volume would greatly affect
the fast-paced business of music and media royalty accounting
firms, not to mention the negotiation and litigation involved in
working out royalty payment disputes. Furthermore, ISPs might be
subject to additional duties, thereby potentially increasing vulnera-
ble to secondary liability for participating as middle-men in fraudu-
lent or otherwise unauthorized transactions, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily. ISPs would certainly not want to sacrifice any of their
existing immunity under section 512 of the Code by participating in
data collection or enforcement at the direction of third parties. 106
Explicit statutory immunities would be necessary to reduce transac-
tion costs and ensure participation by ISPs.
In short, questions remain concerning the determination of
the basis and frequency of collecting fees.107 Uniformity of units,
methods for measuring usage, as well as, rates applied are necessary
elements to implement any collective rights licensing scheme to be
considered "fair" by rights holders. Whatever mechanism is chosen
to determine an online use fee would also need to take into ac-
count the rights of reproduction, distribution and public perform-
ance, a consideration that is often ignored by proponents of
collective licensing.10 8
Lastly, one needs to address market disruption concerns. In-
troduction of a new mandatory collective rights licensing system
could unnecessarily accelerate the reduction in sales of physical me-
dia products, which represent a substantial percentage of the
world's media sales market.109 Industry experts argue for a more
gradual transition away from physical distribution technology,
104. See id. (describing BigChampagne's system of tracking downloads).
105. See Desai, supra note 100 (explaining skepticism surrounding technology
used in tracking downloads and other types of media consumption on internet).
106. See 17 U.S.C. §501 (2002) (elucidating what constitutes infringement of
copyright).
107. See Merante, supra note 87 (mentioning concerns on basis and frequency
of collection fees).
108. See Merante, supra note 87 (highlighting considerations to take into ac-
count when setting an online use fee).
109. See Desai, supra note 100 (discussing several criticisms of voluntary collec-
tive licensing).
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which will allow media companies to successfully cross the chasm
and develop over time a more robust and variegated digital distri-
bution market. 110 Furthermore, new media services like Hulu,
iTunes and Netflix are starting to post positive results and experi-
ence successful growth in new markets for high quality digital con-
tent which many believe will grow to represent many billions of
dollars."' A new mandatory collective rights system might cut this
growth off at the knees, superseding completely or otherwise dis-
rupting the business of existing or future legal downloading
services.
Viewed in its best light, a compulsory collective licensing
scheme would be difficult to implement, requiring a departure
from market-based economics in a society defined by its strict ad-
herence to capitalism. Even if implemented, difficulty arises as to
whether the system can address the concerns of rights holders and
new businesses attempting to create innovative new products to
benefit consumers.
IV. OPT-IN IN EXCHANGE FOR COVENANT NOT TO SUE
The alternative most often proposed to a government-man-
dated collective licensing scheme is a voluntary collective rights li-
censing scheme implemented through a private agreement
between rights holders and users.i1 2 Rights holders would sign a
covenant not to sue any users who 'opt-in' to pay licensing fees for
media they consume.' 13 Any user opting into the agreement would
recieve an unlimited ability to stream and download copyrighted
content with impunity from legal prosecution.114 As part of the
agreement, the user would agree not to share copyrighted content
with anyone who had not opted in, if violated the user would face
110. See Peter DiCola, The Economics of Recorded Music: From Free Market to just
Plain Free, FUTURE OF MUSIC COAL. (July 16, 2000), http://futureofmusic.org/arti-
cle/economics-recorded-music (arguing the value of music should not be mea-
sured in dollars or left to the free market).
111. See Desai, supra note 100 (stressing importance of not disregarding
growth of media service businesses in informing debate about collective licensing
agreements).
112. See Fred von Lohmann, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing
ofMusic File Sharing, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 1 (Apr. 30, 2008), available
at http://www.eff.org/files/eff-a-better-way-forward.pdf (proposing voluntary li-
censing as alternative to government-mandated licensing schemes).
113. See id. at 5 (providing fans with ability to download music without threat
of being sued and providing artists with compensation for their work).
114. See id. at 1, 5 (arguing fans would be able to get music they want through
legitimate and appropriate means).
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monetary penalties.115 Those opting-out of paying the fees would
remain liable for copyright infringement." 6 Creators and rights
holders would also be able to opt-out of this licensing scheme." 7
ISPs would receive an administrative fee in connection with the opt-
in arrangement. Newly-created CROs would be responsible for
tracking media consumption by those opting-in and distributing
royalties to rights holders. Supporters of voluntary collective rights
licensing contend that any solution to digital piracy should be cen-
tered on market forces because the market drives innovation better
than the government. 18 For example, proponents argue that with
the cloud of litigation eliminated, file-sharing networks would rap-
idly improve.119 Additionally, they believe that an opt-in system
would also be more respectful of subscriber preferences. 120 Pay-
ment would come only from those who are interested in download-
ing or otherwise sharing entertainment on the Internet, and
limited to the period for which they are interested in such sharing
and downloading activities.' 21 As with the government-mandated
system, opt-in users would have completely legal access to the virtu-
ally unlimited selection of media available on file sharing net-
works.' 22 Unlike the mandatory public right option, users would
not be forced to pay for media content if they do not choose to
access it.1 23 Giving users the choice to pay the fee voluntarily could
also help to repair the general bad perception many consumers
now have regarding copyright owners. 124 In addition, this system
might clarify to the general public the degree to which artists and
115. See id. at 1 (stating as long as fans pay for music, they will not fear legal
reprisal).
116. See id. at 5 (asserting artists would still be able to sue fans that illegally
downloaded music and offering alternative means for dealing with problem that
focus on joining collective licensing than dealing with issue in court).
117. See id. (explaining artists still have options and are not forced to join
collective society).
118. See id. at 1 ("any solution should minimize government intervention in
favor of market forces. Markets-driven solutions are likely to work faster, and more
efficiently, than top-down government regimes.").
119. See id. (arguing legalizing downloading music through collective licens-
ing will improve file sharing systems and benefit fans).
120. See id. at 3 (explaining companies would be able to focus on meeting
consumer needs and wants instead of focusing on licensing issues).
121. See id. (explaining there is no tax involved, only those wanting to partici-
pate have to pay).
122. See id. (discussing advantages of voluntary licensing system).
123. See id. (explaining payment will be conditioned on use).
124. See id. at 5 (suggesting voluntary licensing scheme as alternative to
"threatening [consumers] with ruinous damages").
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the creative industries as a whole rely on clearly defined rights and
responsibilities for copyright owners, intermediaries and users. 125
The most striking benefit of a voluntary collective licensing sys-
tem is that no amendments to the copyright law need to be
made.126 Also, instead of relying on a government or collective in-
dustry board to set rates, as with mechanical licenses or ringtone
rates, CROs would set their own prices, which would be dictated by
the market. 2 7 Rights holders' income could potentially increase
with a lower price and a larger base of subscribers, than with the
current system of high prices and expensive, ultimately ineffective,
enforcement efforts.128 In addition, commercial services could de-
velop, boiling the user opt-in agreement into the terms and condi-
tions of the service, and then provide free, basic and premium
services at different price points, including free advertising sup-
ported services.' 29 Proponents of opt-in licensing schemes argue
that so long as the fee is reasonable, effectively invisible to fans and
does not restrict participant's freedom, the vast majority of file shar-
ers will opt to pay rather than engage in complex evasion efforts. 30
Proponents contend that the vast majority of file sharers would be
willing to pay a reasonable fee for the freedom and peace of mind
to download whatever they like using whatever software suits
them.13 They further assert that a compulsory license is not neces-
sary; artists will be incentivized to join a CRO by the prospect of
receiving some compensation for their works, while those choosing
to remain outside the system will have no practical way of receiving
compensation for the file sharing that will inevitably continue. 132
Assuming a critical mass of major copyright owners joins a CRO,
the vast majority of smaller copyright owners will have a strong in-
125. See id. at 4 ("Transparency will be critical-the collecting societies must
hold their books open for artists, copyright holders, and the public to examine.").
126. See id. at 3 (listing advantages of voluntary licensing scheme).
127. See id. (discussing economic implementation of voluntary licensing
scheme).
128. See id. (listing advantages of voluntary licensing scheme)
129. See id. at 2-3 (explaining companies could make free music downloading
part of package for cable or universities would make music downloading part of
their network services costs).
130. See id. at 5 ("Proponents contend that the vast majority of file sharers
would be willing to pay a reasonable fee for the freedom and peace of mind to
download whatever they like using whatever software suits them.").
131. See id. (discussing willingness of file sharers to pay a reasonable fee for
the freedom and peace of mind to download whatever they like, on whatever
software they like).
132. See id. at 5 (discussing incentives to independent artists, particularly for
smaller copyright owners).
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centive to join in order to collect their portion of the fees, just as
virtually all professional songwriters and music publishers opt to
join ASCAP, BMI, SESAC or Sound Exchange.1 3 3
Fred von Lohmann presents further arguments in favor of a
voluntary licensing system.13 4 He stresses that the distribution bot-
tleneck which has limited the opportunities of independent artists
would be eliminated.' 35 Furthermore, artists would be able to
choose any road to online popularity-including, but no longer
limited to, a major label contract.'3 6 Legal, compensated digital
distribution would be equally available to all artists.13 7 In promot-
ing their music, artists would be able to use any mechanism they
like, rather than having to rely on major labels to push radio
play.13 8 With more options from which artists may choose, record-
ing contracts would become more balanced than the one-sided
deals artists have complained about in the past.13 9 Furthermore,
von Lohmann argues that the complexity of individual music indus-
try contracts and the propensity of successful artists to sign many
different contracts over time create difficulty for record labels, mu-
sic publishers and even the artists themselves to be sure what rights
they control. 140 So, the proponents' argument suggests that byjoin-
ing a CRO, copyright owners would not be asked to itemize rights,
but would instead simply covenant not to sue those who pay the
blanket license fee. 141 Accordingly, music fans and innovators
would not be held back by the internal contractual squabbles that
plague the music industry, and artists would be paid their fair
share.142
Many of the same concerns that were identified above in refer-
ence to a government-mandated collective rights licensing scheme
will, however, also plague a voluntary one. These concerns include
133. See Day, supra note 88 at 213-15 (discussing small copyright owners' in-
centives to join CRO).
134. See Lohmann, supra note 112 at 3 (arguing distribution limitations on
independent artists will be eliminated upon implementation of voluntary collective
licensing scheme).
135. See id. at 3 (stressing the ability to eliminate the distribution bottleneck
limiting the opportunities of independent artists).
136. See id. at 3 (listing advantages of voluntary licensing scheme).
137. See id. at 4 (explaining the benefits to artists).
138. See id. (discussing promotion mechanisms of artists).
139. See id. (expressing that recording contracts will be more balanced).
140. See id. at 5 (noting incentives to artists to join voluntary licensing
scheme).
141. See id. at 5 (detailing covenant not to sue contracts).
142. See id. (advocating voluntary licensing scheme would resolve internal
quarrels).
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privacy issues, data collection difficulties, derivative rights, trouble
maintaining ISP immunity, file quality issues and complexities mak-
ing sure that artist and other rights holders are actually paid their
fair share.14 3 Also, like a compulsory license, the opt-in license
tends to flatten the market for sales of music and other media,
which could in turn stifle innovation because there would be no
incentive to produce new media products. In addition, there is the
problem of "free-riding," whereby those who opt-out of paying the
fee can still get free content from those who opt-in, either by some-
how re-routing their Internet connections or simply by having
someone who opts-in burn the content onto CDs or DVDs and then
share the content with someone who opts-out. 144 Uncertainty also
exists as to how far these covenants not to sue will extend.145 Will
copyright holders retain the right to sue an ISP for secondary liabil-
ity if the scheme allows, even unwittingly, a user to re-route his con-
nection? Consumers may also be at serious risk in a world where
authorized and unauthorized works are at their fingertips with no
clear ability to distinguish between the two.146 Would a green "OK"
tag pop up on media you could use? Would you only be able to use
"opt-in approved" services that bear the equivalent of a Good House-
keeping seal of approval, making the choices of opt-in users no dif-
ferent than the choices they have today with the legal services?
Furthermore, what is to force ISPs to cooperate and take on the
additional burdens of tracking and recording who is accessing what
content for a reasonable fee? What is to keep them from demand-
ing a larger and larger portion of the fees being collected from
users? Already in the mobile content arena, retailers and promot-
ers of mobile content must make a business from fifty percent or
less of their product prices, with the mobile service providers col-
lecting fifty percent for delivering such mobile data services. 147
Given that a substantial segment of the population is currently ac-
143. See Brandon Evenson, IP Osgoode Speaks: Chris Castle on Voluntary Collective
Licensing, IP OSGOODE (Oct. 27 2009), www.iposgoode.ca/2009/10/ip-osgoode-
speaks-chris-castle-on-voluntary-collective-licensing (discussing potential problems
with voluntary licensing schemes).
144. See Desai supra note 100 (arguing that new scheme will have no impact
on current amount of infringement taking place by consumers).
145. See id. (explaining risk of confusion to users).
146. See id. (warning that potential issue of consumers not being able to dif-
ferentiate between authorized and unauthorized work, thus opening themselves
up to risk of unintentional participation in illegal activity).
147. See Edward R. Hearn, Digital Downloads and Streaming: Copyright and Distri-
bution Issues, 978 PLI/PAT 477, 493 (discussing ratio of profits earned by retailers
after delivery fee is taken out by service providers)
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cessing content free of charge, how can content holders be sure
that enough people opt-in that it will make the system worthwhile?
Opponents of voluntary opt-in services cite a wide variety of
reasons why they believe proponents to be, in the main, myopic
about the incentives present in human nature and capitalist socie-
ties.14 8 "Proponents of the generic proposal and its offshoots seem
to have given insufficient consideration to the many, many details
involved in ISP licensing. The devil is, of course, in the details, and
even considering a music-only licensing method creates a devilish
predicament indeed."149 Hence, the main problem that an opt-in
collective rights licensing system faces is the same problem faced by
any new product introduced into a new market: getting users to try
something new, where the benefits are unclear and-further-en-
ticing users to allow their names to be put on a list that may some-
day include people who are prosecuted for witting or unwitting
copyright infringement.
V. CONCLUSION
This article describes the historical underpinnings of collective
rights licensing in the United States and attempts to fairly present
the two primary proposals for collective rights licensing at the ISP
level for internet media uses. In addition, the article discusses the
issues and impediments that would have to be overcome in order to
implement any ISP licensing scheme here. The article purposely
does not state an opinion about whether either of the proposals is a
good idea. Either proposal would be difficult to implement, and
could face opposition from a wide variety of interested parties. Fur-
thermore, there are many market-based approaches, which have
not had the opportunity to evolve because of difficulty obtaining
licenses and rapidly changing technology and market conditions.
Our current copyright regime, developed over hundreds of years of
trial and error, has adapted to a great many new technologies and
business models. Past collective licensing systems, including com-
pulsory licensing schemes, have been adopted when the market for
a particular right was seen as "broken" and in need of being fixed.
In the United States, collective licensing has been successfully ap-
plied to public performances, radio and mechanical licenses for af-
148. See Evenson, supra note 143 (discussing issues with voluntary licensing).
149. Christian L. Castle and Amy E. Mitchell, What's Wrong With ISP Music
Licensing?, 26 ENr. & SPORTs LAw. J., 4, 7 (2008).
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fixing copyrighted works to a tangible medium.150 The ability to
instantaneously distribute media using the Internet is not a prob-
lem to be fixed, this is rather a set of opportunities which have not
yet been fully understood or exploited. The Internet is a far more
exciting technology than the past technologies of recordings or ra-
dio because the Internet is worldwide and allows for interaction
and commerce. A panoply of new businesses can develop, which
take advantage of these attributes. In fact, they are rapidly develop-
ing, whether we choose to accept it or not. There will not be any
one solution to illegal downloading of media on the Internet. As in
the past, a wide variety of new markets will form and innovations
that benefit consumers, rights holders and business people will de-
velop. Collective rights licensing schemes may become part of this
ecosystem. Thus, as long as they "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts," and are not implemented at the expense of new
markets that could develop in their absence these schemes will have
an influential role in the future.1 5 '
150. See Collective Management, supra note 70 (discussing successful application
of collective licensing in United States).
151. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
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